Showing posts with label Everyman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Everyman. Show all posts

Thursday, 22 May 2014

Everyman and the data inspector

Everyman is dreaming of a future.

Data Inspector: Good morning, citizen. We have reason to believe you have data in this house.

Everyman: Who told you that?

DI: Someone who knows.

Everyman: It would be a strange house that didn’t have data in it, wouldn’t it?

DI: All the same, we have to act on reports received.

Everyman: At dawn?

DI: You heard us. We require entry to inspect the data on these premises. We suspect it may be inaccurate, incomplete or irrelevant to the purposes for which it was collected or further processed.

Everyman: This is my private house. It’s my personal information.

DI: Your personal information? We’ve heard it names other people. That makes it their information.

Everyman: It’s still my private house.

DI: From which you run a little business on eBay.  No household exception for you.

Everyman: I don’t have to answer your questions.

DI: Ah, but you do.  How else can we perform our duty to the public?

Everyman: What about my privacy?

DI: Privacy begins at home. So that's where we start.

Everyman: By invading my privacy?

DI: We protect privacy, we don’t invade it.

Everyman: You seem to be about to invade my home.

DI: Sometimes you have to sacrifice privacy to preserve privacy.

Everyman: So what do you want to know?

DI: Who is the data controller in this house?

Everyman: How should I know that?

DI: You are required to know that. The data controller should have notified us.

Everyman: Well you’ve got me there, haven’t you?

DI: When did you last clean your data?

Everyman: Clean?

DI: Scrub it - remove excessive, irrelevant or out of date data. We like to see hygienic data practices, citizen.  Dirty data is a menace.

Everyman: Sounds like the last public health campaign.

DI: Exactly.  Unclean data spreads.  We could have a national data contamination crisis on our hands.  You know our motto: “Healthy data makes a healthy mind”.

Everyman: So you think I’ve got a secret store of mouldy old data hidden away here, do you? 

DI: I’m sure of it.  We have a duty to discharge and you’re starting to be obstructive.

Everyman: What else do you want?

DI: Do all your appliances conform to privacy design standards?

Everyman: And if they don’t?

DI: You’ll be put on our list.

Everyman: What list is that?

DI: The privacy offenders register. Everyone should know who can and can’t be trusted with their data.

Everyman: How long would I be on it?

DI: Permanently.

Everyman: No right to be forgotten, then?

DI: Not where privacy breaches are concerned, my friend. Far too serious.

Everyman: Well, thank you for your interest. Now please leave.

DI: Not that simple, citizen.  Sledgehammer, please.

Everyman: (wakes up).


[Now dedicated to the memory of John Blundell, who died on 22 July 2014. Find out the connection here.]




Friday, 29 November 2013

Everyman links to a copyright work

Everyman: I’m trying to understand copyright and linking. With three pending references to the CJEU (Svensson, C More Entertainment, BestWater) I guess we will get some clarity before too long?

Scholarly Lawyer: We’ll get decisions. Clarity would be a bonus.

E: Why is this an issue at all?  Doesn’t everyone link on the internet?

SL: Of course. Trillions of links cause no problem at all. But some copyright owners want the right to control who creates links, or at least public links, to their works.

E: Do they have any basis for that? 
SL: The main battle at the moment is around the copyright communication to the public right.  Some national courts have said that it covers some types of linking.

E: Even where the rightsholder has put the material on the internet itself?  We’re not just talking about linking to infringing copies?

SL: Communication to the public is a pretty blunt instrument. It just refers to communication to the public of ‘works’. 
E: Which could cover authorised as well as unauthorised copies?

SL: Exactly. If the right covers linking to infringing copies, on the face of it copyright owners end up with a right to control linking to material that they have put on the internet themselves.
E: Which would be absurd.

SL: Most people would think so.  Even the most devoted adherents of strong copyright tend to stop short of arguing that rightsowners should be able to control simple linking to their own material.  
E: So where do they draw the line?

SL: They tie themselves in knots trying to do it.  The reality is there is no obvious principled basis on which to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate linking within the communication to the public right – and probably no comprehensible one either.

E: But didn't Mr Justice Arnold recently distil 18 principles from the nine CJEU cases on communication to the public?

SL: Yes. A heavier burden than one sentence of any EU Directive should have to bear.
E: What about reference linking?  Isn’t that a good dividing line?
SL: No-one agrees on what reference linking is. All links have a reference function because they refer to resources on the internet.  But you are right: the International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI) based their recent Report and Opinion on what they called reference linking.

E: How did they define it?

SL: They distinguished between a link direct to specific material protected by copyright, using its URL; and a link which “does not make a specific protected material available, but merely works as a reference to a source where it may be possible to access it and where access to the specific work itself or otherwise protected material is not achieved.”

E: A bit of a mouthful, but doesn’t that make some sense?

SL: Not really.  This is a link to the ALAI report – a PDF file. The ALAI’s position is that it needs their permission (assuming they are the copyright owner), because it is direct to specific copyright protected material using its URL. A link to a file, in other words.
E: OK then, this link is to the page containing the ALAI report. Aren’t they saying that that link shouldn’t need permission because it only refers to a source from which you can access the report?

SL:  If so, it doesn’t help. The page that you have just linked to is itself probably a copyright work. The link may be a reference link viz a viz the report, but it is a direct link to the webpage using its URL. The webpage is an HTML file.  So on the ALAI’s logic it must need the permission of the copyright owner of the web page. You still end up in the position that every link – even a link to a home page – needs permission, unless the target page is for some reason not protected by copyright.

E: Oh. What sort of other links are there?

SL: You name it.  Simple links, deep links, inline links, embedded links, framing links, aggregating links, links to infringing copies, links to downloads, links to streams.

E: But none of them involves the linking site in storing the copyright material?
SL: Correct, except where the linking code has captured a thumbnail of a target image or video. And in none of them is the linking site or link creator part of the transmission stream.  That always goes direct from the target site to the user.

E: Does that matter?

SL: The Copyright Directive talks about the right to authorise or prohibit communication to the public of the work “by wire or wireless means”. According to Recital (23) the right “should not cover any other acts”.
E: That’s why the UK copyright legislation says the communication must be "by electronic transmission"?

SL: Yes. So you would expect the right to apply to those who initiate or intervene in the actual transmission.  That’s been true of every CJEU case so far.  The furthest the CJEU has gone, in Airfield, is to include someone who provided the encryption key and decryption card that enabled a user to receive an encrypted broadcast. The CJEU said this was an intervention without which those subscribers would not be able to enjoy the works broadcast.
E: Seems a long way from linking.  Surely people can access a work on the internet whether or not someone has linked to it?

SL: If it is publicly available, yes. The European Copyright Society Opinion on Svensson leads with the transmission point.  They say “Hyperlinks are not communications because establishing a hyperlink does not amount to ‘transmission’ of a work, and such transmission is a pre-requisite for ‘communication’.”  

E: But many national courts have held that linking can be a communication to the public.  If intervention in transmission is required, how can they have done that?

SL: By taking a very broad view of intervention.  The courts have tended to consider intervention in the availability of the work generally, without really focusing on whether there was intervention in the transmission.
E: Does any of this really matter? Isn’t linking so widespread that we all have implied permission to do it?

SL: Not if there are express licence terms on the target website.  And probably not if the link is to an infringing file.  In any case implied licence doesn’t address some pretty fundamental objections to requiring permission. Is a Twitter user really supposed to access the target site and check whether there are express licence terms, and if not consider whether there might be an implied licence, before tweeting (or retweeting) a link to an item on it? And how can the tweeter tell if the siteowner is entitled to give permission? In Svensson the link was to articles licensed by a newspaper, but which the plaintiff journalists said the newspaper didn’t have their authority to license.
E: I feel a chilling effect coming on.

SL: You’d be right.
E: Didn’t Tim Berners-Lee say that a right not to be referred to pulls the rug from under free speech?

SL: Yes. And SABAM v Scarlet demonstrates that the days when copyright could sit in its own little bubble, finely dissecting the wording of copyright treaties without regard to the human rights framework around it, are long gone at least in Europe.



E: If there are international treaties, don’t we have to abide by them?
SL: Certainly, but copyright instruments are not the only international treaties to which we adhere. The European Convention on Human Rights is also an international treaty. A copyright treaty has to be interpreted in a way that is compatible with and takes into account international treaty obligations in respect of fundamental human rights.

E: Aren’t some types of linking still potentially damaging to copyright owners?

SL: Perhaps, but the communication to the public right is far too blunt an instrument to catch culpable behaviour while leaving the rest alone.  If you want to catch culpable behaviour, there are better tools such as accessory liability for someone else’s infringement.  However that is outside the CJEU’s remit as it is not harmonised across the EU.
E: Roll on Svensson.

Saturday, 2 November 2013

Everyman meets a copyright radical

(In the interests of balance: Everyman learns respect for copyright)


Everyman: Nice set of stickers you have there.
Copyright Radical: Glad you like them. Down with the Copyright Fascists!
E: Excuse me?
RadiC: Just practising. Day of Action tomorrow.
E: About copyright?
RadiC: Knowledge is a common resource. Defend the public domain. Preserve the commons.  Freedom is sharing.  Copyright enslaves us.
E: Seemed like a voluntary exchange when I paid for my books.
RadiC:  Information wants to be free.  Copyright bars the way. 
E: Information isn’t free. Movies don’t get made for nothing. 
RadiC: Free as in speech, not free as in beer. 
E: Doesn’t change anything.  Who will make movies if anyone can copy the product?
RadiC: Paintings came before copyright.
E: When mass copying was impossible.
RadiC: So when copying was expensive, the investment to do it had to be protected.  Now it costs nothing, copying has to be stopped?
E: Aren’t you ignoring public goods? 
RadiC On the contrary. Knowledge is a public good.
E: That sounds bad.
RadiC:  How so?
E: This economics textbook says that consumption of a public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  So an unlimited number of people can take a free ride on the author’s creative investment.  That leads to underproduction of creative works.
RadiC: You can prove anything with economics.
E: The book says that copyright addresses the free rider problem by introducing excludability. It creates the possibility of a functioning market.
RadiC: So we end up with big business controlling knowledge. 
E: Not a dynamic marketplace of ideas?
RadiC: Don’t be ridiculous.
E: Isn’t the alternative worse?
RadiC: Knowledge as the commons. Sounds fine to me.
E: If public goods are underproduced, next thing you have the State stepping in to correct market failure.
RadiC: Collective democratic action.
E: A State-sponsored representative elite controlling the creative commons in the interest of the voter coalitions whose interests it serves.  What’s free - as in speech - about that?
RadiC: You’d rather have unaccountable monopoly US corporations?
E: What the State controls the State rations, including knowledge.  Especially knowledge.
RadiC: This is about copyright, not the State controlling speech.
E: Shouldn’t we just try to have the right amount of copyright? Not too little, not too much.
RadiC: ‘Goldilocks Copyright Now!’ Remind me to make a sticker.  

Everyman learns respect for copyright

(In the interests of balance: Everyman meets a copyright radical)

Maximus Copyright: Hey, you!
Everyman: Me?
MaxC: What do you think you’re doing?
E:  I’m reading this interesting little blog about IT and internet law.
MaxC: You got permission to do that?
E: Who from?
MaxC: Me.  Or the Family.
E: They are?
MaxC: Relations and neighbours.
E: Nice to meet you all.
The Family: Thief! Thief! Thief!
E: What’s this about?
MaxC: This is my patch.  You’re on it.  Pay or get off.
E: I’m only looking.
MaxC: That’s using. Needs permission. Or should do1.
E: But there are paths.  They say Public Right of Way.
MaxC: You see the TPMs?
E: I'm guessing that's the barbed wire.
MaxC: Right. Illegal to cut it.
E: Is there anything I can do around here that isn't illegal?
MaxC: You've got to learn respect. People these days don't show the respect due to the Family. How did you find this place, anyway?
E: That link. It’s marked.
MaxC: This is serious.  An unlicensed link2. Take it down, boys.
The Family: Thief! Thief! Thief!
E: Who’s that over there? You haven’t introduced her.
MaxC: Minima.  She’s the other branch of the family.  We don’t speak.
E: No?
MaxC: They have crazy ideas. Balance, proportionality, reasonable expectations of users.  "The Family will get respect if it gives up some land".  Morons.  I tell you how we get respect, by strong enforcement.
E: Not by education, then?
MaxC: Education of course.  But it has to be the right sort of education.
E: The right sort?
MaxC: The sort that fosters respect. We like to keep it simple. ‘Don’t steal, don’t copy’.  That sort of thing.  If you don’t get the message, something more graduated.  If you still don’t get it, we chop your internet off.
E: Mine?
MaxC: You just keep your nose clean and there won’t be any trouble.
E: I had my nose in this blog until you showed up.
MaxC: Don’t get clever.
E: There’s something I don’t understand about all this.
MaxC: What?
E: If everything needs permission, won't everyone end up breaking the law? How does that foster respect for copyright?
MaxC: You’re starting to sound like cousin Mini and that Hargreaves character she hangs around with.  You need to be educated.
E: How, without any internet access?
MaxC: That's enough. Re-education camp for you.
E: Huh?
MaxC: You'll love it.  The tutors all love copyright. The guards all love copyright. It will be a better world when we all love copyright.
The Family: Take him away! 

Notes:

1.The question of whether merely browsing a copyright work online requires the permission of the copyright owner is currently the subject of a reference to the EU Court of Justice in Newspaper Licensing Agency v PRCA.  The view of the UK Supreme Court was that it should not require permission, in the same way that reading a physical book does not – even if the book is an infringing copy. However the browsing point was of sufficient importance that it should be considered by the CJEU.
2.  The question whether a web link to a copyright work on the internet requires the permission of the copyright owner is currently the subject of references to the EU Court of Justice in Svensson, CMore and Bestwater.

Tuesday, 24 September 2013

Everyman learns about internet jurisdiction

Everyman has just read the questions referred to the EU Court of Justice in C-441/13 Pez Hejduk. [And has now added some Pinckney updates, following the CJEU decision on 3 October 2013.].

Everyman: I see the ECJ has been sent another internet jurisdiction case.

Scholarly Lawyer: Keep ’em coming.

E: Well on my count they’ve had 9 internet jurisdiction referrals in 6 years: Pinckney; Martinez/eDate Advertising; Wintersteiger; L’Oreal v eBay; Sportradar; Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof, Blomqvist, and now this one.  What’s going on?

SL: Lots of tricky stuff, in actual fact.  But let's get straight that they’re not all jurisdiction cases.  You have to understand four different things: territoriality, jurisdiction, applicable law and the Electronic Commerce Directive.

E: They are all about cross-border internet liability, yes?

SL: Yes.

E: So why four different labels?

SL: So first we have territoriality.  Between you and me, no-one understands this apart from IP lawyers.  But it’s important.  Take copyright. Each country’s copyright law applies only within its borders.   To infringe UK copyright, you have to do an act within the UK.  If you do the same thing in France, that would infringe French copyright.  Or maybe not:  UK and French copyright are not the same.  

E: But what’s the problem?  Surely it’s obvious where a copy is located.

SL: Yes, although copyright can apply to transient copies and on the internet those spring up everywhere.  But anyway copyright isn’t just about copying.  You can infringe copyright in a load of different ways. 

E: Can we keep this simple?

SL: So if you put an infringing copy on your UK website, that’s not just copying but also making available to the public – a separate type of copyright infringement. But your website can be read anywhere in the world.  Does that mean you are infringing by making available to the public only under UK copyright, or under the copyright laws of every country in the world, or maybe just some of them? They’ve been having fun at the ECJ with that question.

E: So, what’s the answer? 

SL: Basically, targeting.  For database right…

E: Weren’t we discussing copyright?

SL: Have patience.  For database right the ECJ said in Sportradar that, country of the server apart, making available to the public occurs in the countries to which you target your website.  They said much the same for use of a trade mark in L’Oreal v eBay. 

E: Dare I ask about copyright?

SL: For copyright, they said in Titus Donner that targeting applies to the distribution right (that’s a third way of infringing copyright).  Actually no one has asked them about making available and copyright yet, though your Mr Justice Arnold has held that targeting applies.    

E: So targeting applies to everything then?

SL: Not so fast.  You might think so, but that would be too simple.  Clearly it doesn’t apply to copyright infringement by copying, since that is down to where the copy is made.  Also, the ECJ can only opine on rights that are harmonised across Europe.  That cuts out a chunk of criminal law, not to mention personality rights such as privacy and defamation.

E: So those are down to national laws?

SL: Correct.  Your national courts decide whether the right is territorial under your national law; and if so they apply their own test for the location of the act.  For example your English defamation courts have gone off in a completely different direction from targeting. According to them (and the Australian and New Zealand courts), a defamatory statement on a website is published wherever in the world it can be read and comprehended.  That's a mere accessibility rule, and bad news for the internet.

E: OK, we’ve done substantive law.  Let’s move on to jurisdiction.

SL: Yes, let’s. I’m sure you know the basic rule under the Brussels I Regulation.  You have to sue an EU defendant in the Member State of its domicile.  But there are many exceptions, including the particularly slippery Article 5(3).  That says that for a tort claim you have the option of suing a defendant in the location of the harmful event.  In an early pollution case the ECJ said that that includes the place where the damage is suffered. 

E: That makes sense if you’ve got toxic chemicals flowing down the Rhine – it only brings a handful of extra countries into the frame.  But if you apply that doctrine to the internet, doesn’t the whole world come into play? And within the EU wouldn’t that completely undermine the basic rule?

SL: Article 5(3) causes a lot of trouble.  Because it’s an exception Article 5(3) can’t be allowed to undermine the basic rule.  But you’re right, it’s very easy to argue that on the internet the damage is suffered wherever the effects of the website are felt.  The ECJ is also supposed to provide a high level of protection to IP rights; which could mean allowing rightsholders to sue in any country in which the IP right is infringed.

E: That makes sense, doesn’t it?  Otherwise every court will be clogged up applying the IP laws of foreign countries.

SL: Up to a point, but at the jurisdiction stage it’s only an allegation of infringement.  If a plaintiff only has to make an unsupported allegation to get jurisdiction in the country in which it wants to bring proceedings, then the basic defendant's domicile jurisdiction rule disappears.

E: So should the national court consider the strength of the allegation before taking jurisdiction?  

SL: Good question.  But that’s for each national court’s procedure.  Some countries maintain a clear distinction between jurisdiction and the substantive right; and others, such as England, will look at whether there is a good arguable case of substantive infringement when they consider jurisdiction.  And that brings into play the territoriality of the substantive right.  It’s all very difficult.  [Pinckney update: The CJEU seems to be coming perilously close to saying that jurisdiction and the substantive right must be kept completely separate (para 41 and 42) - even though in Shevill the CJEU said that the standard by which to test jurisdiction is for the national court.  We may start to wonder if the English approach is consistent with EU law.  The UK government made no submissions in Pinckney.]

E: But if, say, a targeting test were part of Article 5(3), then territoriality wouldn’t feature so much.  And all the national courts could apply a uniform jurisdiction rule.

SL: Well spotted.

E: But the ECJ hasn’t said that yet, has it?  In fact its Article 5(3) decisions seem to be all over the place.  Not only do they set different tests for off line defamation (Shevill), online defamation and privacy (eDate/Martinez) and online trade marks (Wintersteiger), but none of them has adopted targeting. 

SL: Wait for Pinckney. [Pinckney update: Well, the CJEU seems very happy with the idea that the meaning of Article 5(3) can vary according to the substantive right (para 32)].

E: That’s the one where the Advocate General has said the ECJ should declare the reference inadmissible? [Pinckney update: The CJEU declared the reference admissible.]

SL: That aside, it’s a copyright case.  The AG has suggested that if the ECJ declares it admissible then Article 5(3) should be aligned more closely with territoriality.  So the AG says that for communication to the public in copyright, the place of damage should be subject to a targeting test. [Pinckney update: Oh dear.  The CJEU has gone in the opposite direction and said in terms (para 42) that Article 5(3) does not require targeting.  Mere accessibility appears to be sufficient (paras 44, 47, operative part).] 

E: That’s all very well, but what on earth does it mean to target a country?  Isn’t that a very uncertain test?

SL: Shazam!  I produce a decision they made earlier: Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof.  It was nothing to do with IP rights or even tort, but the ECJ explained exactly what it means to direct activities at a Member State.  And they have referred to it each time they introduce a new targeting test.  So every time they apply the targeting test in a new area you can look up Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof to find out what it means.

E: That’s quite enough of jurisdiction.  Where does applicable law fit into all this?  Surely if a territorial right is engaged, then it must follow that that territory’s law applies?

SL: Well you’re right – in fact you might think there is no room for a choice of law rule at all.  But not all claims are about territorial rights.  And anyway we have the Rome II Regulation (plus the Rome I Regulation for contractual claims), which lays down choice of law rules for all sorts of non-contractual claims, including some that are territorial. 

E: Don’t tell me that Rome II gives a different answer.

SL: Fortunately, no.  For infringement of IP rights the applicable law is that of the country for which protection is claimed.  When you think about it, that’s really territoriality in different words.

E: So it seems simple enough.  A court has to apply the Rome I or II rules and then, assuming it has jurisdiction, decide the case on the basis of the applicable substantive law.

SL: Not exactly.  Now we have to factor in the ElectronicCommerce Directive.

E:  We’ve done substantive law, we’ve done applicable law and we’ve done jurisdiction.  How can there be room for anything else?

SL:  There’s always room for the internal market rules of the European Union.  These embody the principle of free movement of goods and services which underpins the EU. 

E: Go on.

SL: The Electronic Commerce Directive applied the internal market rules to online services.  The Directive says that one Member State cannot restrict online services incoming from another Member State. 

E: Which it would do by applying its own national law?

SL: Yes, or any other law that the receiving Member State’s court has decided is applicable.  In eDate/Martinez the ECJ said that if the applicable law is stricter than that of the foreign Member State from which the online service is being provided, the court must disapply it.

E: My head’s spinning. You’re telling me that having gone through the whole procedure of establishing jurisdiction and determining that its country’s law is applicable, the court then has to disapply that law again if it is stricter than the law of the defendant’s own country?

SL: If the defendant’s country is in the EU or EEA, exactly so. Except, that is, for IP as it's one of the fields excluded in the Annex.  Fun, isn’t it?

 [Pinckney update added 3 October 2013. Blomqvist added, 6 October 2013.]

Tuesday, 20 August 2013

Everyman encounters Government

A dialogue for our times.

Government: We know what’s best for you.
Everyman: I think I’m the best judge of that.

G: Ah, but we know things that you don’t.

E: What things?

G: Can’t tell you, they are secret.

E: So how can I tell whether you are right?

G: You need to trust us on that.

E: Why should I trust you?

G: Because we are fighting your enemies.

E: Who are my enemies?

G: Can’t tell you, you might warn them.

E:  You don’t trust me?

G: No-one is above suspicion.

E: Am I a suspect?

G: We never comment on operational matters. But if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.

E: What do you know about me?

G: We never comment on intelligence matters.

E: Can you be trusted?

G: We always act proportionately and in accordance with the law.

E: Show me.

G: Don’t be silly, that’s secret.

E: How do I know you don’t think I’m your enemy?

G: You don’t.  But if you carry on asking questions we might put you on a list.

E: On what grounds?

G: That would be telling. 

E: When would you do it?

G: If it was necessary in the interests of national security.

E: Is that legal?

G: We always act proportionately and in accordance with the law.

E: How can I be sure of that?

G: Trust us.  We know best.